Diverse Religions and Universal Ethics

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Abstract:
This paper attempts to find out whether there is a common moral ground underlying apparent diversity of religions. It is needless to say that Religion and Morality are not synonymous. Conceptually and in Principle, they are two distinct kinds of Value systems independent of each other. Yet, religions have value frameworks that guide adherents in determining Right and Wrong. Every Religion in the Globe claims to preach moral values that will be ultimately beneficial for the society. In spite of their apparent differences, is there any common condition on which they all agree? What kind of investigation is appropriate, for putting to the test such a claim or exploring such a possibility? Stewart Sutherland, in a recent paper, argues against the view that holders of different beliefs can be said to have common values whenever they are observed to be following similar moral precepts. Moral actions have to be individuated with reference to the intentions of those who do them, he opines. However, there are others who react in a positive way to the question of universal morality beyond differences in religious aspects. In order to establish peace and harmony in the world, it should be our endeavour to search for such a common thread.

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Ekam sat viprah bahudha vadanti. (The Truth is but one, though the learned state it in many ways.)—Rig Veda c. 1000 B.C.

Do followers of different religions share common ground at the level of their morality, despite their disagreements over doctrine and metaphysical beliefs? A typical statement of this view was made recently by the Dalai Lama

"I maintain that every major religion of the world - Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Sikhism, Taoism, Zoroastrianism - has similar ideals of love, the same goal of benefiting humanity through spiritual practice, and the same effect of making their followers into better human beings. All religions teach moral precepts for perfecting the functions of mind, body, and speech. All teach us not to lie or steal or take others' lives, and so on. All religions agree upon the necessity to control the undisciplined mind that harbours selfishness and other roots of trouble, and each teaches a path leading to a spiritual state that is peaceful, disciplined, ethical, and wise. It is in this sense that I believe all religions have essentially the same message. Differences of dogma may be ascribed to differences of time and circumstance as well as cultural influences; indeed, there is no end to scholastic argument when we consider the purely metaphysical side of religion. However, it is much more beneficial to try to implement in daily life the shared precepts for goodness taught by all religions rather than to argue about minor differences in approach."

What kind of investigation is appropriate, for putting to the test such a claim or exploring such a possibility? Present-day seekers of common ground, concerned as they generally are about international peace and security and the pursuit of a global civilized society, have a right to expect some guidance from religious studies where there is, presumably, expertise to be found in this area. How is the comparative religionist to respond? And what guidance can the philosopher give, in making sense of the question being posed?

The obvious place to begin is where the moral dimension of religions becomes most explicit; i.e. in the form of teachings or precepts. Here we find lists of rules, commandments, laws, codes of conduct, models and paradigms, by which ideals and principles are illustrated and virtues and vices exemplified. Sayings, maxims, proverbs teach these principles, and when filled out with narrative they form myths, parables, allegories and legends, all aiming to reinforce certain kinds of behaviour and discourage others, by cultivating appropriate attitudes and emotions.

The discovery of a number of shared moral precepts (e.g. versions of the Golden Rule) amongst different religions seems to offer prima facie evidence, at least, for moral common ground as a reality. Moreover, the modern history of religions shows that the sharing of similar material is often not accidental. Religious moralities appear to draw on an international pool of resources, including law-codes, heroic legends, moralistic fables and wisdom literature, gathered throughout history amongst a variety of races and cultures. Wilfred Cantwell Smith has recently illustrated his view
of a ‘world process of religious convergence’ with a moral tale which can be shown to have passed through several Indian traditions, as well as Manicheism and Islam, before entering Christian folklore as the Baal Mad Josaphat legend and reaching modern thought through its influence on Tolstoy and Gandhi.  

The demonstration that moral codes and precepts are common property in religious history might well be taken to support the contention that a universal morality is there to be seen, at least in an emerging form, by the unprejudiced observer who takes a broad, cross-cultural view. It is clearly too simple, however, to think that because followers of different religions assent, on occasion, to similar sets of moral precepts, they therefore must share moral common ground in some significant way. What is important in comparing moralities is not merely the rules people assent to in principle, but why and to what extent they follow them in particular cases, especially in cases of moral conflict or dilemma. Only when these details are appreciated can an observer be said to understand the moralities in question and be in a position to make reliable comparisons between them. To assume that once differing religious beliefs are down-played a common moral code will emerge is to ignore the fact that similar rules and precepts may be adopted as means to different ends. The nature of those ends will determine the sense in which the precepts are understood and applied by those who follow them.

Stewart Sutherland, in a recent paper, argues against the view that holders of different beliefs can be said to ‘share an ethic’ whenever they are observed to be following similar moral precepts. Sutherland does not deny that there is prima facie common ground across the frontiers of religious belief. But genuine sameness of action cannot be established, as in the case of physical objects, by mere observation or comparison. Moral actions have to be individuated with reference to the intentions of those who do them. And as intentions entail beliefs, we are not entitled simply to assume that people ‘may agree about what ought to be done without necessarily agreeing about the way the world is’.

In Sutherland’s example two men, Barry (a Marxist) and Brendan (a Christian) do appear, superficially, to be carrying out the same moral action – in this case driving lorry loads of food to a refugee camp. But when fuller descriptions of their intentions are given, involving on the one hand Marxist world-view, goals and values, and on the other hand Christian ones, it becomes apparent that what they are each doing is not in fact the same action in a moral sense, at all, and so they cannot be said to ‘share an ethic’ at that point.

From this it would seem to follow that adherents of different faiths – say, a Buddhist, a Christian, and a traditional Maori – may not in a moral sense be doing the same action at all when each, for instance, gives food to a starving enemy or, for that matter, kills a brother or robs a neighbour. For it will be according to quite different systems of belief, involving such diverse concepts as karma, sin and tapu respectively, that the parties will explain their motives, characterize their intentions, or lament their misdoings.

Such common maxims, then, as may be found in various religions (Tell the truth, do not kill, respect the property of others, feed the starving) do not necessarily reveal any underlying commonality. Like shared items of devotional practice (rosaries, candles, bodily postures) or like architecturally similar buildings (temples, synagogues, churches, mosques) what they reflect may not be any essential common factor, but only a coincidental similarity of means to quite different moral ends.

Sutherland’s argument, extended along these lines, throws considerable doubt on the likely success of any attempt to demonstrate the existence of natural moral laws, or a shared basic morality, by appealing to similarities in teaching or practice amongst followers of different religions. The problem lies not only with the notion of an action, but with the word moral itself. As Sutherland uses the word (and here he reflects modern philosophical usage) morality is necessarily associated with certain kinds of intentionality. The identifying and characterizing of actions as moral involves reference to aims and intentions, beliefs and explanations, on the part of the agents in question. A rule, precept or law becomes a moral action-guide for a particular piece of conduct only when it is adopted with the appropriate kind of intention in mind.

Comparisons of rule or precept-following in order to discover moral common ground will of necessity involve comparisons of intentionality. A demonstration of shared rules or precepts, or even of similar behaviour, will not be sufficient, for it fails to take account of the variety of differing intentions which may accompany those regularities. This is even more true of the attempt to demonstrate common ground simply by selecting from religious moralities
the shared precepts and practices, and deliberately discarding ‘differences at the theoretical level’.

For all that, it is undoubtedly the case that from time to time people who hold different and conflicting religious beliefs do nonetheless find themselves, like Sutherland’s Barry and Brendan, disposed to act according to similar maxims and to involve themselves in common patterns of behaviour. Is this to be considered as morally of no significance at all - a matter of sheer coincidence? Sutherland admits that his argument does not preclude what he calls ‘partial overlap’ in descriptions of the actions of holders of different ultimate beliefs. But the overlap, he says, ‘may turn out to be very limited indeed both in extent and significance’.5

It is here that Sutherland’s argument, cogent though it is in theory, may well be felt by the historian of religions to do less than justice to the phenomena of religions themselves and of morality in religious contexts. It is remarkable, for instance, that while emphasizing the need for adequate criteria to individuate and describe actions, Sutherland says so little about how to identify, and distinguish between, the systems of belief in terms of which, on his argument, the moral intentions of different agents are to be defined. He refers variously to ‘different theological or metaphysical positions’, ‘patterns of belief’, ‘view-points’, views about ‘the way the world is’, ‘habits and rules of thinking’, and so on. But no clear way is offered for aligning these abstractions with the living world of religious belief and action.

At one point, Sutherland says his thesis does not commit one to the view that there are as many ‘ethics’ as there are thinking human beings, and admits that ‘an elucidation of the reasons for this would be instructive’.6 But he gives no hint of what those reasons might be. Yet if we are going to give the sense which he suggests to the notion of ‘sharing an ethic’, we must have criteria for estimating appropriate degrees of sameness (i.e. similarity) between two or more belief-systems.

Reliance on commonly-used names or labels is obviously inadequate, given the reality of religious diversity. Do all Hindus share a common ethic; or only Shavite with Shavite, Vaishnavite with Vaishnavite? Do the trinitarian beliefs of Catholic, Lutheran, and Kumbangust Christians unite them on a moral common ground, while excluding Unitarians and Latter day Saints? No doubt some theological beliefs will be more relevant than others to the moral outlook of adherents. Does the traditionalist Christian who expects a ‘literal Day of Judgement’ adhere to the same belief-system, for moral purposes, as the modernist who does not? Or might the traditional Christian in fact have more in common, on this score, with the orthodox Muslim, who similarly undergirds his conduct with a belief in ‘That Which Is To Come’? Questions like these reflect the growing awareness in modern religious studies of the inadequacy of thinking of religious faiths as clearly distinguishable by reference to static, named systems of belief with clear boundaries.7

Studies of religious change and interaction show that when followers of theoretically quite distinct faiths are thrown together in situations of practical necessity, implicit adjustments are made, priorities reassembled, compromises accepted, in the interests of common well-being. Thus over a period of time basic doctrines can come to be related in quite different ways to the moral outcomes and sensitivities they are believed to entail. Even religious belief systems containing such diverse concepts as karma, sin, and tapu which earlier were given as instances of distinctly different beliefs, may turn out to be capable of undergoing mutual influence through the pressure of a moral concern for dialogue, cultural interaction and the like.8 The existence, nowadays, of a vigorous Christian/ Marxist dialogue may even raise the question whether the two systems Sutherland takes to be obviously incompatible must necessarily be so under all possible interpretations.

It would, of course, by quite unjustified to conclude from the evidence of inter-religious dialogue, that all differences of religious belief can in the end be adjusted to meet common moral interests. But to rule out any significant or substantial common ground because of incompatibility of beliefs at the most general or ultimate level seems to remove moral theorizing too far from the experience of moral agents in practice.

People holding divergent ultimate beliefs about ‘the way the world is’ do commonly, nowadays, in multi-cultural societies especially, find themselves acting side-by-side in situations of common concern.9 Discoveries like this are part of the experience of life by which one’s ultimate beliefs themselves are put to the test. Religious ideologies which down-grade immediate personal and communal concerns in the interests of some long-term or supposedly ultimate ideal seem likely, sooner or later, to arouse a sense of their own moral inadequacy. It is to this sense that reformers of religions commonly appeal; as is illustrated, for instance, by Jesus’s story of the Good Samaritan, by
Muhammad's denunciation of the Meccan cult, or by Mahatma Gandhi's rejection of the caste system.

Common ground sought between different peoples today, moreover, is likely to be related to issues on which long-established religious belief-systems have little specific to say. The uses of nuclear energy, the control of environmental pollution, genetic engineering, information storage, and so on, raise questions about human life and the world itself which are not easily answered from within any of the existing ideologies. There may well be situations, then, in which divergent ultimate beliefs are neither determinate enough, nor play an immediate enough part in the thinking of the people 'in question, to stand in the way of their genuinely sharing concerns at the moral level. The here-and-now benefits of arriving at similar moral conclusions, in other words, may carry greater conviction and be a truer expression of religious commitment than is loyalty to some more remote interpretation of an ultimate theology or ideology.

This possibility is well illustrated from the situation in which world religions have found themselves, in recent years, with the emergence of international agreements regarding human rights. In its Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948 proclaimed as 'a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations' a number of rights and fundamental freedoms. These include the right to life, liberty and the security of person; freedom from slavery, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; equal and fair treatment before the law; freedom of movement; rights to nationality, family life, ownership of property; freedom of thought, conscience and religion, expression, peaceful assembly and association, and a variety of others. The Declaration has served as a model for subsequent international conventions, and for numerous Bills of Rights entrenched in constitutions of many countries.

While 'human rights' have legal and political implications as well as moral ones, the U.N. Declaration may nonetheless be viewed as a global affirmation of moral common ground. It is offered without theological or ideological justification, yet it reflects ethical norms defined by common consent amongst nations whose members include the widest possible range of religious affiliations. Can these adherents of different religious faiths genuinely affirm an intention to be bound by the Declaration, as a set of common moral precepts, despite the differences and incompatibilities amongst their ultimate beliefs? In a recently-published discussion of human rights by representatives of world religions, there is a clear concern that the resources of religious belief should be drawn upon, in a combined effort to make the U.N. Declaration universally effective. As one contributor puts it:

In this new world of intercultural bonds and international communications, there is splendid opportunity to stimulate common effort for the support of human rights. Not only is there an opportunity through theology as a discipline to take an expanded role in fostering intellectual support for these rights... but religiously formed persons also have a greatly expanded opportunity to insist upon and campaign for the strengthening of the supportive social processes and institutions which shape cultural mores with respect to rights.10.

There is also frank admission that in certain respects the world religions themselves, in their own histories and institutions, do not meet the moral standards proclaimed in the Declaration. For instance, in areas such as sexual equality, freedom of speech and conscience, and religious toleration, it is admitted that the religions left to themselves have failed practice to attain anything like the universality of scope which the Declaration proclaims. Both in theory and in some serious reinterpretation of belief-systems will be needed, it is recognized, to make genuine assent to the Declaration possible. As the Hindu contributor comments:

It is evident that the establishment of human rights among Hindus demands not only social reform movements, but also exploration, investigation, and reinterpretation of the theoretical foundations underlying the social hierarchy of Hinduism.11

Other writers (e.g. Buddhist and Jewish) seem more confident that human rights as defined by the Declaration are already encompassed, implicitly or explicitly, by their ultimate beliefs, and that in their affirming these common moral principles, only practice, not ultimate ideology, will need to be brought into line.

There is a clear impression created, of theologians casting about in their respective traditions for concepts and arguments by which to justify and reinforce commitment to a common morality the content of which, in today's world, they find compelling in itself. A Catholic scholar, for instance, appears to have little doubt about the primacy of shared moral commitment over ultimate theoretical justification. He writes,
A very good case can be made that the appeal of human rights norms themselves is really far broader than the appeal of any philosophical or theological foundation which may be offered for them.\footnote{12}

In describing the process of justifying this prior moral conviction as ‘casting about for concepts and arguments’ I do not wish to imply that such rationalization is a spurious activity, intended only to save the appearances. Rather, it is an indication of the open texture even of ultimate belief-systems, and the two-way relation between them and the immediate moral and religious experiences of adherents. Were this not the case, it would be difficult to account for the change and reform of religious ideologies which takes place continually, in the light of wider encounters at the moral and social levels. There are reasons for thinking, then, that Sutherland’s argument too lightly dismisses the significance of common moral intentions, shared by followers of different religions at a level less than that of ultimate beliefs about ‘what the world is like’. In practice, when asked to give reasons for their moral actions, representatives of a religion may well express themselves in the concepts of the official ideology, with reference to its ultimate goal and world-view. Yet this may not be the best guide as to what for them personally, in a particular situation, are the most relevant moral considerations. (This must be still more true for adherents who are inarticulate or barely aware of the official world-view. Suppose, for instance, Sutherland’s ‘Brendan’ is a convert from a freshly-evangelized hill tribe, and ‘Barry’ a peasant, newly-recruited into the Vietnamese army. Neither will have much grasp of the ultimate principles of their new-found belief-systems.

There will, undoubtedly, also be situations such as those Sutherland envisages, in which the apparent similarity of effect and even of precepts will in no way count as a genuine moral sharing, because the ultimate beliefs and intentions on the part of one or more of the parties will explicitly exclude that interpretation. (Christians holding firmly to a Calvinist theology, for instance, may reject ‘universal human rights’ as an unscriptural product of secular thought. They may still, however, find themselves able to affirm many of the same principles as those of the U.N. Declaration, on the basis of a belief in Divine covenants of grace.\footnote{13}) Given the difficulty of individuating belief-systems, and of determining which, in the minds of the moral agents themselves, are incompatible with which, confidently identifying situations where moral common ground is excluded will not be as straightforward a task as Sutherland’s argument suggests.

According to the argument so far, then, moral teachings found by inspection to be shared by many religions will not in themselves count as evidence for a common morality existing by some natural necessity, in the way that natural law theories supposed. What inspection can reveal will be contingent, though perhaps quite widely-occurring, similarities in recommended moral conduct, resulting from commitment to similar principles and ideals. This can be said to amount to a genuinely shared ethic when, for the parties concerned, the intention to regard those principles as matters of moral agreement is not consciously excluded through adherence to incompatible ultimate beliefs.

Among the factors which open the way for such inclusive intentions may, of course, be the presence of beliefs about universal moral principles, carried in the scriptures of religious traditions or enshrined in their dogmas. (No doubt the availability of scholastic natural law theory assisted in Pope John XXIII’s endorsement of the U.N. declaration of human rights in the encyclical Pacem in Terris.)

From the fact that representatives of different religions may proclaim ‘Despite our theological differences we all acknowledge the same basic moral precepts’ it does not follow that they do. What may follow, however, is that through proclaiming that belief, they increase the likelihood that their followers will, in situations of potential common moral concern, adjust their own intentions so as to identify them with those of others holding different ultimate beliefs.

Pronouncements like that of the Dalai Lama (‘All religions teach common moral precepts’) are not to be taken, then, as descriptions of an actual state of affairs. They are, rather, pleas for religions to make common cause (in the interests, in this case, of world peace), interpreting and adjusting their traditions of belief so as to be able intentionally to affirm such common concerns as moral. What is offered, in other words, is encouragement for a creative theological enterprise; not a description of an already-existing universal moral bedrock, there to be uncovered once religious differences are set aside.

In reply, then, to the question, Do different religions share moral common ground, the answer must be: Yes, from time to time they do, when their belief-systems are found to be sufficiently flexible of interpretation to permit believ-
ers to have inclusive moral intentions in situations involving common action. But this in itself does little to show that universal moral laws, independent of culturally-borne religious beliefs and intentions, are waiting to be discovered at the level of common human nature.

References:
8. In the contemporary theology of Melanesian, Maori and Pacific Island Christianity, indigenous concepts such as *mama* and *tapu* are freely used to help interpret Biblical morality and soteriology. On compatibilities between Hindu and Christian moralities see *Christian and Hindu Ethics*, by Shivesh Thakur (George Allen and Unwin, 1969).
9. For an introduction to the range of inter-religious activities in modern Britain, see appendix to *God Has Many Names*, by John Hick (Macmillan, 1980). See also *Religious Co-operation in the Pacific*, edited by Emiliama Afeaki and others (University of the South Pacific, 1983).
11. *Ibid.* p. 84
14. Whether the proposal is capable of being implemented, by whom, for how long, at what cost to other beliefs, and so on, are other matters entirely.